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Modeling a Clean Energy Standard for Electricity: 
Policy Design Implications for Emissions, Supply, Prices, and Regions 
Anthony Paul, Karen Palmer, and Matt Woerman 
Abstract 
The electricity sector is responsible for roughly 40 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions, and a shift away from conventional coal-fired generation is an important component of the 
U.S. strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Toward that goal, several proposals for a clean energy 
standard (CES) have been put forth, including one espoused by the Obama administration that calls for 80 
percent clean electricty by 2035 phased in from current levels of roughly 40 percent. This paper looks at 
the effects of such a policy on CO2 emissions from the electricity sector, the mix of technologies used to 
supply electricity, electricity prices, and regional flows of clean energy credits. The CES leads to a 30 
percent reduction in cumulative CO2 emissions between 2013 and 2035 and results in dramatic reductions 
in generation from conventional coal. The policy also results in fairly modest increases on national 
electricity prices, but this masks a wide variety of effects across regions.  
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Modeling a Clean Energy Standard for Electricity: 
Policy Design Implications for Emissions, Supply, Prices, and Regions 
Anthony Paul, Karen Palmer, and Matt Woerman 
1.  Introduction 
When the U.S. Senate failed to adopt any of the many legislative proposals for an 
economy-wide cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions during the 111
th 
Congress, the Obama administration and other policy innovators started to develop a collection 
of strategies to help reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. These policy chunks, as President 
Obama referred to them in a September 2010 interview with Rolling Stone magazine, include 
stricter CAFE standards for vehicles, Clean Air Act rules to reduce CO2 emissions from coal-
fired utility boilers and other point sources, policies to promote energy efficiency in buildings, 
and clean energy standards for the electricity sector.  
A clean energy standard (CES) is similar to a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), but it 
includes a broader range of non-CO2-emitting and even low-CO2-emitting technologies. Under 
an RPS, electric utilities are required to supply a certain percentage of the electricity that they 
deliver to customers using qualified renewables. Typically, the percentage goes up over time, 
and in some cases there are carve-outs for particular types of renewables, such as solar 
photovoltaics or hydrokinetic. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have some form 
of RPS in place; the targets and timetables, set of qualified renewables, and other features of 
these state policies differ widely.1 Under a CES the set of technologies that can be used to meet 
the standard is expanded to include other non-CO2-emitting technologies, such as nuclear and 
hydro. The standard may also give partial credit to generation from coal (or natural gas) with 
                                                 
 Anthony Paul is a Center Fellow in the Center for Climate and Electricity Policy at Resources for the Future, 
Karen Palmer is a Senior Fellow, and Matt Woerman is a Research Assistant. The authors wish to thank David 
McLaughlin for research assistance and Dallas Burtraw and Ray Kopp for helpful comments. All remaining errors 
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1 For more information on state RPS policies see the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/ (accessed May 25, 2011).  
2 Aldy (2011) proposes a standard based on CO2 emissions intensity and granting of credits to generators who meet 
the standard; these credits can be sold to generators who fail to meet the standard.  
3 Parry and Williams (2011) show that if the allowance revenue from cap-and-trade isn’t used to reduce 
distortionary taxes or if emissions allowances are allocated for free, a cap-and-trade policy would be substantially 
1 For more information on state RPS policies see the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency at 
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carbon capture and storage or to natural gas combined-cycle units. Some forms of a clean energy 
standard also give credit to electricity savings from energy efficiency programs. 
In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama announced a goal of producing 
80 percent of electricity using clean energy sources by 2035. This announcement was followed 
by the release of a brief summary of a clean energy standard that would achieve this goal. The 
policy would give full clean energy credits to technologies that emit no CO2, such as nuclear and 
renewables, and partial credit to coal with CCS and efficient natural gas. The exact parameters of 
the administration policy have yet to be specified. On March 21, 2011, the staff of the Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee issued a white paper that sought comment on several 
design elements of a CES that would be consistent with the goals that the president had laid out. 
This paper analyzes a CES that is broadly consistent with the policy outlined by the Obama 
administration and considers the effects of different design parameters and different contexts on 
the performance of the standard. The paper begins by comparing a CES with a cap-and-trade 
policy and then considers different CES design parameters. Section 2 looks at the conceptual 
relationship between a CES and electricity prices. Section 3 discusses the design parameters of a 
CES. The rest of the paper is devoted to our simulation analysis of the CES policy using RFF’s 
Haiku electricity market model, which is described in the Appendix. Section 4 describes the 
scenarios that we model. Section 5 describes the results and section 6 concludes. 
2.  Comparison of a CES with carbon pricing 
A CES is less efficient at reducing CO2 emissions than a cap-and-trade policy or other 
approach that imposes a price on CO2. There are two reasons for this. 
First, by categorizing generators by broad technological and fuel categories, a CES fails 
to capture heterogeneity in CO2 emissions rates within categories, and it will not impose the 
efficient relative incentive levels within or across categories. A price on CO2, in contrast, causes 
each individual generator to bear a cost that is proportional to its CO2 emissions rate, and it 
therefore provides the incentive for generators to lower their heat rates or take other steps to 
reduce CO2 emissions intensity to reduce emissions-related costs. A CES could be adapted to be 
more efficient by setting the standard based on heat input or emissions rates and placing the point 
of compliance on generators instead of distribution companies.2  
                                                 
2 Aldy (2011) proposes a standard based on CO2 emissions intensity and granting of credits to generators who meet 
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Second, a CES does not yield electricity prices for consumers that reflect the full social 
cost, including the CO2 emissions cost, of the electricity they consume. A policy that prices CO2 
emissions directly will yield electricity prices that reflect these costs if the emissions allowances 
are distributed using an allowance auction.3 If the cost of CO2 emissions is not reflected in 
electricity prices, then consumers will consume more electricity than is economically efficient, 
and emissions reductions will be excessively expensive. An allowance auction is used in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions from 
electricity generators in the northeast, but most other proposed or adopted cap-and-trade 
programs initially allocate some of the allowances for free to local distribution companies to 
moderate the electricity price effect of imposing the cap. However, most programs, including the 
AB32 program in California, recent federal cap-and-trade proposals, and the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme, envision ultimately auctioning most of the allowances, which would 
serve to pass the CO2 price signal on to electricity consumers.4  
3.  CES design parameters 
 The design parameters of a CES can affect the effectiveness and cost of the policy in 
several ways. 
3.1. Eligible technologies and crediting  
The most restrictive form of a clean energy standard is a renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS), limited to renewable technologies. Under an RPS, the only technologies that qualify for 
credits are those that use renewable sources of energy; most RPS policies exclude existing hydro 
but include new hydro and both existing and new nonhydro renewables. Because of the large 
differences in cost across renewables technologies, an RPS that treats all renewables the same 
                                                 
3 Parry and Williams (2011) show that if the allowance revenue from cap-and-trade isn’t used to reduce 
distortionary taxes or if emissions allowances are allocated for free, a cap-and-trade policy would be substantially 
more costly than a CO2 emissions rate standard for the power sector. This higher cost is attributable to the 
confounding effect of higher energy prices on lowering the returns to labor effort resulting from the income tax 
system. Parry and Krupnick (2011) argue that this tax interaction effect means that a CES that is implemented as a 
CO2 emissions rate standard with a ―feebate‖ will likely be more efficient that a cap-and-trade policy that doesn’t 
auction allowances and doesn’t use the revenue to offset existing distortionary taxes. 
4 Note that if allowances were allocated for free to electricity generators, the ultimate effect on electricity price 
would depend on whether electricity prices were set by regulation at average cost or in markets at marginal cost. 
Under this approach to allocation, prices would rise by more in competitive regions than in regulated ones (Paul et 
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would tend to favor the low-cost renewables, such as biomass and wind, and do little to 
encourage higher-cost renewables, such as solar. To help boost the more expensive renewables 
and promote cost reductions through scale economies and learning, some states have carve-outs 
or tiers in their RPS policies that create subcategories of technologies, each with its own 
standard, to ensure that these technologies also benefit from the policy. Another way to favor 
particular technologies is to grant them multiple credits per MWh of generation. These types of 
carve-outs raise the cost of the RPS policy in the short run or reduce total generation from 
renewables, but arguably, assuming there are opportunities for learning by doing, help reduce the 
costs of these less mature technologies, making them lower cost in the future. 
A broader CES can include other non-CO2-emitting technologies as well as lower-CO2-
emitting technologies, as mentioned above. Typically, a technology that does not emit any CO2, 
such as nuclear, is treated the same as a renewable in that each MWh of generation receives one 
credit. For other technologies, such as coal or natural gas with carbon capture and storage, where 
most but not all of the CO2 emissions are eliminated, each MWh generated receives partial credit 
based on its emissions rate relative to the emissions rate of a typical coal-fired generator, which 
is on the order of 90–95 percent. Similar logic applies to the determination of credits given to 
natural gas generation; for example, efficient natural gas plants have a CO2 emissions rate of 
roughly 50 percent that of a coal-fired boiler.5 
Treatment of energy efficiency 
A truly ―technology-neutral‖ CES would also include credits for electricity savings 
resulting from investment in energy efficiency. The added flexibility from including electricity 
savings from energy efficiency investments presumably would promote the lowest-cost approach 
to meeting the clean energy standard and raise the political acceptability of a CES proposal. 
Indeed, the Renewable Energy Promotion Act of 2010, sponsored by Sens. Bingaman (D-NM) 
and Brownback (R-KS), incorporates energy efficiency into the RPS by allowing just over 25 
percent of the renewables standard to be met by savings from energy efficiency programs. A bill 
put forward by Sen. Graham (R-SC) also allows for energy efficiency credits to meet exactly 25 
percent of the clean energy standard. In addition to placing a limit on the contribution of energy 
                                                 
5 Palmer et al. (2010) analyze a clean energy policy standard that looks very similar to the Core policy analyzed here 
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efficiency to the CES, some of these proposals limit the tradability of credits associated with 
efficiency investments to within-state boundaries. 
However, incorporating energy efficiency into a CES raises uncertainty about the future 
value of clean energy credits, which can be an important source of revenue for developers of 
renewables and other clean electricity technologies. Including energy efficiency in the CES 
means that the energy savings associated with efficiency programs, which are difficult to 
quantify, will have a direct effect on the market price of clean energy credits. Under a linked 
policy, renewables developers will be wary of competing with an energy efficiency program that 
could generate large amounts of credits; they would likely insist on strict verification of those 
savings. 
Emissions rate-based CES 
One way to avoid the categorical decisions about which generation technologies qualify 
would be to make credit determinations based on a more continuous metric, such as a CO2 
emissions rate. This method would develop a threshold CO2 emissions rate per MWh and then 
give credits, based on differences between actual emissions rate and the standard, to all 
generators that outperform the standard and require generators that exceed the standard to hold 
credits to make up the difference. This approach would reward investments at existing units to 
improve heat rates and would differentiate performance in CO2 emissions rates across generators 
in a particular technology class, including natural gas combined-cycle generators and coal-fired 
generators.6  
3.2. Treatment of existing generators 
Whether to qualify existing clean energy facilities for receipt of clean energy credits is a 
decision that involves a trade-off between economic efficiency and equity—not a simple 
decision. The efficiency aspect hinges on whether awarding credits to existing facilities will alter 
their level of production and thus have an effect on CO2 emissions, and whether the higher 
electricity prices resulting from qualifying existing facilities are efficiency enhancing. The equity 
aspect hinges on the regional and shareholder-consumer wealth transfer consequences of the 
choice. 
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To evaluate the effect of qualifying existing clean facilities on the CES policy’s 
efficiency in reducing CO2 emissions, one must consider both the emissions impact and the 
costs. If qualifying an existing facility would not alter its level of production, likely the case for 
generators with low operating costs, then there is no direct emissions reduction benefit. 
Technologies in this category include existing hydroelectric, wind, solar, geothermal, municipal 
solid waste, and landfill gas–powered generators. If qualifying an existing clean facility to 
receive credits would increase its production, then emissions will fall and yield an improvement 
in efficiency relative to qualifying a facility that will not increase production. Biomass, natural 
gas, and some high-cost nuclear facilities fall into this category. 
Qualifying existing generators does impose a cost on consumers, assuming that the level 
of the standard would be adjusted upward to keep constant the expected fraction of generation 
from nonemitting sources under the policy. The cost comes from the elevated standard level, 
which would require each unit of electricity consumption to acquire additional credits, thereby 
raising electricity prices in many regions by more than if the existing generators are excluded. 
Elevated electricity prices have undesirable tax interaction effects (Parry and Williams 2011) but 
also reduce emissions by reducing consumption. On net, the CO2 reduction efficiency effects of 
higher electricity prices remain an open question in the literature. 
The overall efficiency effect of qualifying existing generators, including the effect of 
higher electricity prices, is difficult to value ex ante. However, qualifying existing facilities that 
will increase production must have a greater efficiency effect than qualifying existing facilities 
that will not alter production. Generators with the highest operating costs are the most likely to 
alter production levels when awarded credits and therefore provide the biggest efficiency gain 
(or smallest efficiency loss) via reduced emissions.  
The treatment of existing facilities in a CES also has regional implications that depend on 
the geographic distribution of the type of facility in question. This is discussed in detail in 
Section 5.6. 
3.3. Coverage  
A CES policy must specify which utilities and which MWhs are covered. Several RPS 
policies proposed in the 111
th Session of Congress exclude utilities with sales below a threshold 
value, which ranges from 1 million to 4 million MWh annually across the different proposals. In 
the latter case, this would exclude approximately 23 percent of electricity sales, which could 
make the 80 percent clean energy goal articulated by the Obama administration impossible to Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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achieve. It also might create perverse incentives for keeping local distribution companies small 
so that they avoid having to comply with the standard. 
Many recent federal RPS and CES policy proposals exempt generation from existing 
hydro and nuclear facilities from compliance. Generation from these facilities accounts for 
roughly 27 percent of total generation in 2010 and roughly 23 percent of baseline generation in 
2035, so excluding these units from the denominator of the CES means that the percentage of 
credited generation required by the policy would have to be raised to achieve a particular level of 
clean generation, relative to a policy in which these existing sources are not excluded and are not 
counted as qualifying for credits. 
3.4. Targets and timetables 
A CES policy needs to specify targets and deadlines by which these targets are to be met. 
As suggested above, the stated targets—or more accurately, the relationship between the 
standards specified in the policy and the stated goals of the policy—will depend importantly on 
what technologies are eligible to receive credits, the awarding of partial credits, and which 
MWhs are covered by the policy. In general, the percentage requirement of the policy will 
increase as more technologies, such as existing hydro and nuclear facilities, are either excluded 
from the policy or included in the policy and qualified for full crediting. 
The timetables for these policies can vary in length and aggressiveness in terms of the 
speed with which targets are ramped up. The timetables matter less if the policy allows banking 
and borrowing of credits, which are described in Section 0. 
3.5. Credit trading 
A CES policy will be substantially more efficient if it allows trading in clean energy 
credits than if it does not. For maximum efficiency, trading should be national in scope and 
trades across state borders should not be limited. A consequence of open credit trading is that, as 
shown in Section 5.6, some states or regions will be net sellers of clean energy credits and others 
will be net buyers. Regional transfers of wealth are thus inevitable, although there may be ways 
to design the policy to limit the extent of those transfers at the cost of national efficiency. 
Exploring these trade-offs is beyond the scope of the current modeling analysis but is an 
important topic for future research. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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3.6. Banking and borrowing 
Banking and borrowing are important flexibility mechanisms in any trading scheme: they 
help smooth out price or cost fluctuations over time associated with compliance with the 
requirement. There are no reasons to place restrictions on banking in this policy. On the other 
hand, unlimited borrowing could be problematic, as it tends to undermine the incentives for 
electricity retailers to be committed to the continued existence of the program.  
Some amount of borrowing is probably a good idea to deal with unforeseen 
circumstances or delays in bringing new generators on-line that could compromise compliance. 
This type of contingency could be handled by having an alternative compliance payment that 
kicks in if sufficient credits are not available at a stated price, but allowing borrowing would 
require some excess generation of clean energy in the future that would help maintain the 
environmental integrity of the policy as well as its goals for total clean energy generation. 
Allowing for a three-year compliance period (and thus borrowing within the compliance 
window) is a common practice that could put some reasonable bounds on borrowing activity and 
limit the possibility that the debt is never repaid. 
3.7. Point of compliance 
Most CES and RPS policies set the point of compliance at the local distribution company 
or electricity retailer. An alternative approach would place the point of compliance on electricity 
generators; this would be particularly attractive if the policy were sufficiently disaggregated to 
provide incentives for improvements in heat rates at fossil fuel generators. For example, if the 
standard were specified in terms of an average CO2 emissions rate per MWh instead of 
percentage of MWh from a particular category of generators, then shifting the point of 
compliance to the generator would provide incentives for improvements in heat rates to reduce 
the credit requirements at an existing fossil-fueled generator, as discussed in Section 0. Placing 
the point of compliance at generators’ heat input would also induce heat rate improvements. 
3.8. Alternative compliance payment and revenue allocation  
To limit the costs to the economy of imposing a CES, most policy proposals include an 
alternative compliance payment (ACP) for clean energy credits.7 The regulated entities could 
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make such payments in lieu of purchasing clean energy credits, and thus the ACP essentially 
imposes a cap on the price of those credits.8 ACPs have been a feature of most prior federal RPS 
and CES proposals introduced in the past few sessions of Congress. The RPS proposals would 
replace the renewable production tax credit, which has lapsed and been reinstated several times 
since it was first initiated. The tax credit is currently set at $21/MWh, and this value was adopted 
as the ACP for some of the recent RPS proposals. Other proposals include ACP levels as high as 
$50/MWh.  
For a CES policy with a target of 80 percent generation by clean sources in 2035, an ACP 
of $21/MWh would have two important consequences. First, it is much too low to remain 
nonbinding through 2035 and would therefore lead to a level of clean energy production far 
below the target. Second, if credit banking will be a feature of a CES, then an ACP that doesn’t 
rise or rises only at the rate of inflation will become increasingly more likely to bind over time. 
With banking, credit prices are expected to rise at the rate of interest (along a Hotelling path) as 
long as there are credits in the bank. Thus any ACP price that does not rise accordingly will 
become more likely to bind. One solution is simply to set an ACP price that rises at the expected 
rate of interest over time.9 
When the ACP is binding, it will create a pool of revenues for the government that could 
be used for a variety of purposes: research and development into renewable technologies, refunds 
to electricity consumers to help offset consumers’ cost of the CES policy, investment in energy 
efficiency, reductions in other taxes, or deficit reduction. In past proposals, the revenue was to be 
returned to the state from which it came, and the state would be required to use the funds for 
these kinds of investments or refunds. 
                                                 
8 In the debate over cap-and-trade policies for CO2, discussions of a cap on the price of CO2 allowances transformed 
into conversations about a price collar on CO2 allowances that includes both a ceiling and a floor (Burtraw et al. 
2010). The floor could be enforced through the use of tax credits that would take effect only if the price of clean 
energy credits falls below a certain level or a standing offer from the government to purchase clean energy credits at 
the price floor. The price floor creates some price certainty in the clean energy credit market, and this would help 
promote the development of clean technologies.  
9 Aldy (2011) sets an ACP that equals $15 per ton of CO2 per MWh and then rises at 7 percent real per year to reach 
$30 by 2025. This price is expected to be binding, essentially transforming the CES into a CO2 fee. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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4.  Scenarios description 
To explore the effects of different CES policy designs and different assumptions about 
electricity technologies and fuel prices on environmental and electricity market outcomes, we 
model several policy scenarios. We use the Haiku electricity market model, which is described in 
the appendix, to analyze these scenarios.  
All the scenarios that we model are compared with a baseline scenario that represents 
business-as-usual in the absence of any CES policy. The characteristics of the baseline are 
retained in all the CES scenarios, except as specifically mentioned in the descriptions that follow. 
The scenario defined below as Core represents a CES policy that can be evaluated in comparison 
with the baseline, or in comparison with other versions of a CES policy. These other versions are 
defined by a set of deviations from the Core scenario, and they are shown in the tables, figures, 
and text of this document as combinations of abbreviations corresponding to deviations from the 
Core scenario. This section describes the baseline, the Core CES scenario, and the deviations 
from the Core scenario. The abbreviation for each is given parenthetically in the section 
headings. The modeling timeframe is 2013 to 2035. 
4.1. Baseline (BL) 
The baseline scenario represents business-as-usual and is very similar in both 
assumptions and results to the Reference case of the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2010 (EIA 
2010a). Included in the scenario is a representation of the existing state-level RPS policies in 29 
states plus the District of Columbia, aggregated to the 21 Haiku market regions. These policies 
are characterized by the schedule with which the renewable goals are phased in, the basis of the 
RPS (sales, generation, capacity, etc.), the utilities that are required to comply, the types of 
qualifying renewable technologies, the extent of interstate trading of renewable energy credits 
(RECs) that is allowed, and the level of any alternative compliance payment (ACP). Also 
included is a representation of tax credits for renewables that are in place in 6 states (Florida, 
Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah) and those included in the federal American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). ARRA extended the production tax credit available to 
existing wind generators through 2012 and for other technologies through 2013. It also allowed Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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generators to choose between a production tax credit and an investment tax credit, depending on 
which provides more benefit.10  
The BL scenario incorporates several existing environmental policies administered by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), including the SO2 cap-and-trade program under 
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Clean Air Interstate Rule11 restrictions 
on emissions of SO2 in the eastern part of the country, and the annual and ozone season 
restrictions on NOx emissions, as well as the cap on CO2 emissions in the RGGI states (the 
Northeast) and the state-level mercury maximum achievable control technology (MACT) 
programs. 
4.2. Core CES (Core) 
The Core CES policy analyzed here is assumed to begin in 2014 at a level of 12.3 percent 
and become increasingly more stringent (on a linear path) to a level of 57.1 percent at the end of 
the modeling horizon, in 2035.12 Banking of CES credits is not modeled, so a MWh of clean 
electricity generated in a particular year must be used for compliance in the same year. This 
means that the resulting price path may not follow a Hotelling rule that we would expect to 
prevail if banking were allowed. A whole clean energy credit is awarded per unit of electricity 
generated by wind, biomass, geothermal, solar, municipal solid waste, and landfill gas. Both 
existing installations and new investments in these technology types earn a credit. Nuclear 
facilities and hydroelectric power are awarded a whole credit for electricity generated by new 
investments but not for generation at existing facilities.13 Power generated by natural gas–fired 
combined-cycle units, both existing capacity and new investments, is awarded half a credit per 
                                                 
10 The ARRA policy also allows for renewable generators to opt for a cash grant instead of the tax credit. In the 
Haiku model, a cash grant is indistinguishable from an investment tax credit because capital is treated as perfectly 
mobile. 
11 The rule was vacated and remanded to EPA in July 2008 by the federal appeals court, but after a request for 
rehearing, in December 2008 the court remanded the rule to EPA without vacating. Thus the rule remains in effect 
while EPA develops a replacement rule that satisfies the concerns raised in the appeals court decision. This new 
final rule is pending.  
12 These levels would yield 40 percent clean energy in 2014 and 80 percent in 2035, assuming that generation from 
existing nuclear and hydroelectric facilities (which do not qualify for credits) persist at historical levels because of 
the low variable cost nature of these technologies. 
13 Haiku does not model new investments in hydroelectric generation capacity, so the investment aspect of this 
sentence applies only to nuclear investments. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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unit of generation. Generation from coal-fired plants that employ a carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) system is awarded 90 percent of a credit per unit of power. 
Great uncertainty about investment costs surrounds two technologies that could play an 
enormous role in meeting a CES: nuclear and integrated gasification combined-cycle (IGCC) 
with CCS. There are also potential political obstacles to extensive deployment of nuclear power, 
and the regulatory and physical infrastructure necessary to support widespread transport and 
storage of captured carbon is yet to be developed. The Core CES scenario places a constraint on 
the quantity of new capacity of these technology types that can be constructed per year. The 
constraint, implemented separately for the two technologies and for each of the 21 model 
regions, is set to 0.25 percent of total installed capacity of all types in the region in 2008. If these 
constraints were binding in every region in every year for both technologies, by 2035, nuclear 
investments would amount to 56.2 GW and investments in IGCC with CCS would amount to 
61.6 GW. The aggregate constraint is different for the two technologies because of the 
assumption that an IGCC with CCS generator can be constructed in four years, two years less 
than the construction time assumed for a nuclear generator. 
4.3. Credit Existing Nuclear and Hydro (CreditNH) 
The CreditNH scenarios award a whole clean energy credit to existing nuclear and 
hydroelectric capacity per unit of generation. The levels of the standard are adjusted from the 
Core scenario accordingly, to 41 percent in 2014 and 80 percent in 2035, increasing linearly in 
the intervening years. 
4.4. Exclude Existing Nuclear and Hydro (ExcludeNH) 
The ExcludeNH scenario excludes generation by existing nuclear and hydroelectric 
facilities from the total amount of electricity sales required to hold clean energy credits under the 
policy. If the point of compliance for the CES is the local distribution company, as assumed here, 
then determining how many MWh of ultimate sales are generated by existing nuclear and hydro 
poses a challenge, as it is impossible to assign MWh sold at retail to particular types of 
generators. However, separating the excludability characteristic of a MWh generated by an 
existing nuclear or hydro plant from its electricity content would facilitate this type of exclusion. 
This separation can be accomplished by creating an exclusion credit that is awarded for every 
MWh produced by existing nuclear and hydro facilities. These credits give the local distribution 
companies an additional option for compliance with the CES: the company can purchase 
exclusion credits to lower its compliance obligation or purchase clean energy credits to count Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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toward its compliance obligation. Because each exclusion credit reduces its compliance 
obligation by the level of the CES, the price of an exclusion credit in equilibrium will be equal to 
the price of a CES credit times the level of the CES. This equality implies that for modeling 
purposes, the combination of a clean energy credit market and an exclusion credit market can be 
collapsed into a single clean energy credit market in which existing hydro and nuclear units get a 
fraction of a credit (equal to the CES compliance percentage) for every MWh of electricity that 
they generate.  
To achieve 80 percent clean energy by 2035, the goal for this scenario with the 
denominator exclusion needs to be adjusted from the 57 percent target with the numerator 
exclusion to 74 percent with the denominator exclusion with similar adjustments to the targets 
for the years leading up to 2035. 
4.5. Cheap Natural Gas (ChpNG) 
The ChpNG scenarios assume supply curves for natural gas that correspond to AEO 
2011. These curves are substantially cheaper than those that corresponded to AEO 2010, as 
illustrated by the fact that Henry Hub prices for AEO 2011 are typically $2 per MMBTU below 
those forecasted in AEO 2010. The more abundant gas supplies that produce these lower prices 
are the result of more optimistic estimates of the amount of shale gas that will be entering the 
market at relatively low prices. 
4.6. Optimism for Nuclear and IGCC with CCS (MoreNuke/MoreCCS) 
The MoreNuke and MoreCCS scenarios raise the annual construction constraint of 0.25 
percent of 2008 installed capacity to 1 percent of 2008 capacity.  
4.7. Pessimism for Nuclear (LessNuke) 
The LessNuke scenario imposes a constraint on new nuclear investments such that they 
cannot exceed the level of the BL scenario. However, this scenario also allows for the level of 
coal with CCS in the MoreCCS scenario. 
5.  Results  
5.1. CO2 emissions 
A CES such as the Core scenario will lead to cumulative CO2 emissions reductions in the 
electricity sector between 2013 and 2035 of roughly 30 percent, or 20 billion tons, relative to a Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
14 
baseline with no CES policy (BL). The size of the annual emissions reductions will grow over 
time as the standard tightens. In the early years of the policy, Core reduces electricity emissions 
by only a few percentage points compared with BL, but by 2035 annual CO2 emissions from the 
electricity sector are almost 60 percent, or 1.7 billion tons, below the BL level. Cumulative 
emissions reductions are slightly higher with the ExcludeNH scenario, as that scenario precludes 
retirement of some existing nuclear capacity that retires in the Core scenario. Although the 
CreditNH scenario also precludes this nuclear capacity retirement, it also lowers credit prices as 
discussed below, which increases generation from coal-fired plants and yields CO2 emissions 
approximately equal to those in the Core scenario. The CO2 emissions trajectories of the BL and 
Core scenarios, along with the CreditNH and ExcludeNH scenarios, are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. CO2 emissions (billion tons) 
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conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, to reduce total CO2 emissions to 17 percent below 2005 
levels by 2020 and to 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050. Total economy-wide CO2 emissions 
in 2005 were roughly 7.9 billion tons. Assuming a linear path of reductions, emissions will need 
to be reduced by 52.3 percent in 2035, which corresponds to a reduction of about 4.1 billion tons 
of CO2 economy-wide. This CES policy reduces emissions by 1.7 billion tons in the electricity 
sector only, or 41 percent of the total emissions reductions required economy-wide by the United 
States’ pledge. Therefore, additional policies will be required to reduce CO2 emissions in 2035 
by the remaining 2.4 billion tons and to reduce emissions in other sectors. 
5.2. Clean energy credit prices 
The modeling performed for this analysis provides insight into the effect of the price 
levels of an ACP on clean energy deployment. It is important to note that the modeling does not 
account for credit banking and therefore does not find credit prices rising at a discount rate. The 
left-hand panel of Figure 2 shows projected credit prices for the Core CES, ExcludeNH, and 
CreditNH scenarios. The middle panel of the figure shows credit prices under the three scenarios 
but with the ChpNG assumptions about the supply of natural gas. The right-hand panel of the 
figure shows credit prices for the sensitivity cases on nuclear and coal with CCS capacity. 
 





Figure 2. Clean energy credit prices ($/MWh) 
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Four observations about the figure are relevant. First, linear trajectories for the level of 
the standard would yield highly nonlinear credit price trajectories in the absence of credit 
banking. In particular, these CES scenarios would be barely binding until 2020 and then result in 
credit prices substantially above the historically focal ACP level of $21/MWh. If an ACP were 
set at that level, the target levels would fail to be met by a wide margin.  
Second, under the default assumptions on natural gas supply (left-hand panel), the 
inclusion of existing nuclear and hydro generators along with a commensurate adjustment to the 
standard level (the CreditNH scenario) would tend to reduce credit prices, since it would tend to 
raise electricity prices, reduce electricity demand, and therefore reduce demand for clean energy 
credits. The magnitude of the credit price reduction is as great as 9 percent (in 2020), suggesting 
that the ACP level that binds depends on the details of the features of a CES policy. Excluding 
existing nuclear and hydro from compliance with the policy produces credit prices that tend to 
fall in between those in the Core and the CreditNH scenarios. This finding reflects the fact that 
electricity prices in the ExcludeNH scenario tend to be intermediate as well. 
The third observation relates to the middle panel of the figure, which shows credit prices 
for assumptions about natural gas supply that yield lower natural gas prices. The effect of lower 
natural gas prices on the price of clean energy credits will depend importantly on whether natural 
gas is the marginal technology for complying with the standard. In the early years of the CES (up 
until 2025), natural gas is the predominate method for complying, and thus the scenarios with 
lower natural gas prices tend to have lower credit prices. In later years, when other technologies 
are required to comply with the standard, credit prices in the Core+ChpNG scenario are more in 
line with those of the Core scenario.14 
The fourth assumption relates to the right-hand panel of the figure. The prices in the long 
run are quite similar across the three scenarios because either IGCC with CCS or nuclear is 
treated optimistically in each case, and so the CES can be met at a lower cost than in the Core 
scenario. In the medium run, however, quick and extensive nuclear capacity expansion could 
substantially reduce credit prices relative to the LessNuke case, by as much as 28 percent (in 
2020) in the MoreNuke scenario. This shows that the effect of an ACP level depends on 
                                                 
14 In 2035, credit prices are highest in ExcludeNH+ChpNG because this scenario has the fastest demand growth in 
the later years, due to regional differences in electricity prices and demand eleasticities. With faster demand growth, 
additional clean energy sources are required to comply with the CES policy, increasing credit prices relative to the 
other scenarios. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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technological progress in bringing down the costs of nuclear generators, and on the political 
acceptability of extensive nuclear capacity expansion.  
5.3. Generation 
The effect of a CES on the mix of technologies and fuels used to generate electricity 
depends on the future prospects for nuclear power and the cost trajectories for integrated 
gasification combined-cycle plants and carbon capture and storage, as well as how certain 
regulatory hurdles confronting these technologies are resolved and what happens to natural gas 
prices. It does not depend importantly on whether existing nuclear and hydro facilities receive 
clean energy credits under the standard, although as discussed in Section 5.5, this feature will 
affect electricity prices and thus total electricity consumption. 
When we model the effects of a CES with and without crediting existing nuclear and 
hydro, we find that under AEO 2010 assumptions about technology cost and fuel prices and 
supply, nuclear capacity expansion would be the economically preferred approach to meeting the 
2035 standard. The generation mix resulting from not crediting these existing facilities with less 
stringent (and generally nonbinding) constraints on annual nuclear additions is shown as 
MoreNuke in Figure 3 (the other scenarios mentioned in this paragraph are also shown in the 
figure). However, the model fails to capture the public acceptance challenges faced by new 
nuclear plants, which have been brought to the fore and heightened by recent events in Japan, 
and so the extensive nuclear expansion that the model projects may not be politically feasible. 
We therefore constrain nuclear capacity in the Core scenario, as described in Section 4.2. We 
also consider a case (LessNuke) where no new nuclear capacity can be added beyond the level 
observed in the baseline scenario, which yields generation from new nuclear plants that would be 
insufficient to meet the CES after 2020. The model finds that new coal IGCC plants with CCS 
take up the slack, adding about 140 GW by 2035 (as shown in the MoreCCS scenario). However, 
CCS technology also has several sources of uncertainty, including the cost of the technology and 
the regulatory and physical infrastructure necessary to support widespread transport and storage 
of captured carbon. We therefore also constrain coal with CCS capacity in the Core scenario, as 
described in Section 4.2. We find that when both IGCC with CCS and nuclear investment are 
constrained, as in the Core scenario, wind becomes the preferred technology, providing more 
than 20 percent of total electricity generation in 2035. 
   Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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Figure 3. National generation mix (TWh) in 2020 and 2035 for technology sensitivities 
 
 
The effects of the CES on generation mix in 2020 and 2035 for both the AEO 2010 
natural gas price scenarios and the lower AEO 2011 natural gas price scenarios are displayed in 
Figures 4 and 5. Each of these graphs displays baseline generation mixes for each natural gas 
price scenario and three CES scenarios. In 2020 the Core CES causes coal generation to fall from 
50 percent to 40 percent of total generation and results in increases of generation from natural 
gas, nuclear, and wind. The treatment of existing nuclear and hydro has little effect on the 
generation mix, although it does affect the total amount of generation. In the ChpNG scenarios, 
natural gas is more important than in the baseline and Core CES scenarios, but it tends to crowd 
out wind and nuclear in addition to coal. 
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Figure 4. National generation mix (TWh) in 2020  
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By 2035, the Core policy and its variants lead generation from coal-fired steam boilers to 
fall from baseline levels of roughly 46 percent of total generation to between 10–13 percent. The 
share of generation from these facilities is even lower when the policies are combined with cheap 
natural gas. In the ChpNG scenarios, the treatment of existing nuclear and hydro facilities under 
the CES policy influences how the policy affects coal-fired boilers, with generation being lower 
under the ExcludeNH and CreditNH scenarios. This is because the Core+ChpNG scenario causes 
retirement of some existing nuclear capacity, but excluding or crediting this existing capacity 
precludes the retirement and causes some coal capacity to retire instead. By 2035, wind 
generation accounts for more than 20 percent of total electricity supply under the Core scenarios 
and roughly 18 percent in the ChpNG scenarios. Natural gas accounts for just under 25 percent 
of generation in the Core scenarios and closer to one-third of total generation in 2035 in the 
ChpNG scenarios. Generation from biomass is also higher with the CES, but its total 
contribution is less than 5 percent. 
5.4. Retirement 
The CES policy leads to retirements of existing capacity in excess of those experienced 
under the baseline scenario of up to 77 GW by 2020 and between 172 and 194 GW in 2035. 
Most of the retirements are of coal-fired boilers, but the policy also leads to a small amount of 
additional retirements of older gas-fired capacity including steam units, combustion turbines, and 
older combined-cycle units. These retirements of coal and natural gas-fired plants are shown in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Retirement (GW) change from baseline in 2020 and 2035 
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As would be expected, most of the retirements in excess of baseline levels take place in the 
coal-rich  regions  of  the  upper  Midwest  and  Appalachian  states  and  the  Southeastern  states, 
which by 2035 retire 51–63 GW and 43–52 GW of total capacity in excess of the baseline, 
respectively, depending on the scenario. The smallest  differential between baseline and CES 
policy  retirement  happens  in  the  RGGI  region,  where  15–25  GW  of  additional  capacity 
retirement  occurs  by  2035,  depending  on  the  CES  scenario.  The  regional  distribution  of 
retirements of coal and natural gas–fired generators in the Core scenario in excess of baseline 
retirements  is  shown  in  Figure  7.  
 
Figure 7. Regional retirement (GW) change from baseline in Core scenario 
 
The amount of retirement of existing coal varies with the assumptions about potential 
rates of growth for nuclear and IGCC with CCS. In our Core scenario, which assumes limits on 
both nuclear and CCS additions, we find that an additional 145 GW of coal steam generation 
retires nationwide, but we see even greater steam coal retirement under the CES when CCS and 
nuclear are less constrained (not pictured here). An important caveat to these results is that we do 
not consider the possibility of retrofitting existing coal-fired generation with CCS. Depending on Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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costs, allowing for this option could substantially reduce the amount of retirement of existing 
coal under the policy. 
5.5. Electricity prices 
National electricity prices 
The effect of the Core CES policy on the national average electricity price is relatively 
modest, especially in the early years, compared with the price effects that would occur under a 
cap-and-trade program that achieved similar emissions outcomes and passed allowance costs on 
to consumers via retail electricity prices. In 2020, the national average retail price of electricity is 
1 percent higher under the Core CES than under the BL scenario. By 2035 the policy leads to an 
11 percent price increase relative to BL levels. Excluding existing nuclear and hydro facilities 
from the policy (ExcludeNH) results in larger price increases, 3 percent higher in 2020 and 15 
percent higher in 2035. Granting credits to existing nuclear and hydro (CreditNH) and raising the 
standard commensurately also increase the costs of the policy because of the higher credit burden 
on electricity retailers. Under this scenario, the national average electricity price is 5 percent 
above baseline levels in 2020 and 15 percent higher in 2035. These prices are shown in Figure 8. 
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Those national price differences mask large differences across regions; in some regions 
the policy actually leads to lower prices of electricity than in the baseline. These regional price 
effects, which vary depending on the treatment of existing nuclear and hydro facilities under the 
policy, are important to understanding the distributional consequences of the policy.  
Regional electricity prices  
There are two ways that a CES can affect the cost of supplying electricity from any 
particular technology: assuming no exemptions from compliance, all technologies face an 
implicit tax due to the cost of clean energy credits required to cover the consumption that their 
generation serves,15 and all qualifying technologies earn additional revenues from sales of clean 
energy credits. The relationship between the policy’s effects on costs and on electricity prices 
depends on whether electricity prices are set by cost-of-service regulation or by competitive 
markets. The ultimate effect on electricity prices at the state or regional level will also depend on 
the design of the policy, regional resource endowments, and the existing generation mix of the 
state or region. 
The clean energy credit requirement raises the cost of every megawatt hour (MWh) of 
electricity sold by the price of a credit times the level of the clean energy standard. This cost 
applies uniformly to all MWhs sold in the market when all MWhs are subject to the standard. For 
those technologies that receive credits, there is an offsetting reduction in the variable cost of 
supplying electricity that is equal to the price of the credit times the number of credits earned per 
MWh. Because the crediting system leads to investment in generation technologies such as wind 
or nuclear that tend to enter the dispatch order at the front end, this policy will push out the 
existing supply curve and could actually lower the marginal cost of supplying electricity relative 
to a business-as-usual scenario with no policy. 
In regions where electricity prices are set in a market, the price effects will be determined 
by changes to the electricity supply curve and the cost of purchasing clean energy credits to 
cover consumption. The price effect of changes to the supply curve will follow from the 
marginal-cost effect of increased investment in qualifying technologies and retirement of 
existing capacity (nonqualifying capacity will be especially prone to retirement). Regions that 
are heavily dependent on nonqualifying capacity will tend to experience significant capacity 
retirement, which shifts the supply curve to the left and thus will tend to drive up marginal costs 
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and electricity prices. Regions that are richly endowed with renewable resources will tend to 
experience significant new investments, which will tend to drive down marginal costs and 
electricity prices. A CES policy would induce some investment and some retirement in all 
regions, generating offsetting marginal-cost effects. If the net marginal-cost effect of new 
investments and existing retirements reduces marginal cost by more than the cost of credits 
required to cover consumption, then electricity prices will fall. This outcome is not unlikely in 
some regions of the country, especially the Northeast. 
In cost-of-service regulated regions, resource costs for electricity production will rise to 
the extent that new investments in qualifying technologies are induced by a CES policy. If the 
entire country were cost-of-service regulated, then national average electricity prices would 
necessarily rise as consumers bear the burden of these increased costs. Regional prices in the 
cost-of-service regulated regions under our bifurcated system of electricity market regulation 
could fall to the extent that new investments generate credits beyond the volume required to 
cover the demand for credits from local electricity consumption. Excess credits will generate 
revenues from sales to other regions and these revenues will accrue to consumers, offsetting 
increased resource costs. On average, it is expected that electricity prices in cost-of-service 
regulated regions will rise by more than in competitive pricing regions, but any individual cost-
of-service state could benefit from a price reduction under a CES. 
The projected net electricity price effects in 2020 are illustrated in Figures 9–11. The 
price effects for the year 2035 are shown next, beginning at Figure 12. The value shown for each 
region is the projected price under the Core scenario. The color of each region represents the 
change in average electricity price relative to the baseline scenario (no CES policy). All of these 
prices are reported in cents/kWh in constant 2008 dollars. 
 
 
   Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
26 
Figure 9. Regional retail electricity prices and changes from baseline in 2020  
 
The CES policy leads to lower prices of electricity in 2020 in the states that participate in 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, all of which have market-determined prices in the 
model. The policy also results in lower prices in California and the Northwestern states, which 
have an abundance of hydro power and wind resources. Texas and Florida also see lower 
electricity prices with the Core CES policy than under the baseline. The regions of the country 
that rely more heavily on coal tend to see higher prices under the policy; however, for most of 
those regions, prices with the CES policy still remain below the national average. 
Regional price effects depend on the fleet of existing generators, and so changing the 
treatment of existing nuclear and hydro under the policy will have important implications for 
regional prices. Figures 10 and 11 show the regional prices in 2020 under the ExcludeNH and 
CreditNH scenarios, respectively. For each of these two maps, the shading indicates the 
difference in regional prices from the Core CES scenario. Excluding existing nuclear and hydro 
from the CES has a very small effect on national average electricity price in 2020 and tends to 
dampen both the price declines in the RGGI states, Florida, and Texas and the price increases in 
the Southeast. However, it results in even lower prices in the Northwest and even higher prices in 
the Midwest, Plains, and Southwest. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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Figure 10. Regional prices and changes from Core for ExcludeNH scenario in 2020 
 
 
Figure 11. Regional prices and changes from Core for CreditNH scenario in 2020 
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Giving credit to generation from existing nuclear and hydro plants tends to exacerbate the 
price changes in the ExcludeNH scenario, relative to the Core CES. Prices are even higher in the 
Northeast than in the ExcludeNH scenario, although typically, prices in these regions are still 
below baseline levels. Prices also increase in Florida, the Midwest, Plains, and Southwest 
relative to ExcludeNH. The Southeast and Northwest, however, see even greater price declines 
than in ExcludeNH. The price effects of the ExcludeNH scenario are exacerbated in the 
CreditNH scenario because the CreditNH scenario has the higher credit requirement, which 
results in an increase in credit production and more credit trading across states (exports and 
imports). 
In 2035, as in 2020, the CES leads to lower prices in the RGGI states. Prices are also 
lower in the Illinois-Wisconsin region under the Core CES. All of the other competitive regions 
experience higher prices with a CES than without, particularly those that are heavily reliant on 
coal, such as Pennsylvania and Ohio. However, even for those regions where electricity price 
rises because of the CES, it typically remains below the national average price even after the 
policy is implemented. All of the regulated regions see higher prices under the Core CES in 2035 
compared with the baseline. The electricity price effects of the Core scenario in 2035 are shown 
in Figure 12. As in Figure 9, the value in each region is the retail electricity price, and the 
colored shading indicates the change in electricity price from the baseline. 
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Figure 12. Regional retail electricity prices and changes from baseline in 2035 
 
 
Overall, considering both competitive and cost-of-service regions, and considering the 
price effects in 2020 and 2035, the Core CES policy has an equalizing effect in terms of the 
geographic incidence of electricity price effects. The regions of the country that would face the 
highest electricity prices under CES tend to see price reductions from CES or only small price 
increases. Those that would experience the largest price increases would still enjoy relatively low 
prices. 
Figures 13 and 14 show the retail electricity prices that are projected in 2035 in the 
ExcludeNH and CreditNH scenarios. As in the comparison for 2020, the locations of existing 
nuclear and hydro facilities and the effects on electricity market structure are clearly evident. 
Electricity consumers in the regions with abundant nuclear and hydro facilities that price 
electricity on a cost-of-service basis are the beneficiaries. These regions are the Pacific 
Northwest, Northern California, and the Southeast except for Florida, where there is abundant 
nuclear, and hydro in TVA. Gains for these consumers come at the expense of consumers in the 
rest of the nation, especially those in the competitive electricity pricing regions. Note that by 
2035, the difference in price effects between the ExludeNH scenario and the CreditNH scenario Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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is very small. It is striking that the regions that benefit are generally16 those enjoying low 
electricity prices, and that those paying the highest prices will generally pay even higher prices to 
help finance the gains for the Northwest and Southeast. Shareholders in the competitive regions 
also benefit under the CreditNH scenario relative to Core, by $15 billion to $30 billion annually 
between 2020 and 2035. 
 
Figure 13. Regional prices and changes from Core CES in 2035 for ExcludeNH 
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Figure 14. Regional prices and changes from Core CES for CreditNH in 2035  
 
Regional price effects of the policy could also depend on the development of certain 
technologies not included in our modeling. For example, if natural gas with CCS becomes the 
technology of choice, then that will affect the location of investment in new clean generators and 
could alter the regional effects substantially. In addition, if retrofitting of existing coal capacity 
with CCS, also not considered in this analysis, becomes a preferred approach to producing clean 
energy credits, that could reduce the amount of retirement of existing coal capacity, which would 
likely reduce the price effects of the policy in regions heavily dependent on coal. 
5.6. Regional net credit revenue 
Under a CES policy, some regions of the country will be net suppliers of credits while 
others will be net purchasers. For some regions, which position they are in will depend on 
whether existing nuclear or hydro generators are included in the policy and whether they receive 
credits. Qualifying existing hydro facilities, for example, would cause a wealth transfer to the 
regions of the country with more hydro facilities from those with fewer without inducing 
additional emissions reductions. The Pacific Northwest would stand to gain the most from 
qualifying existing hydro. If it does not earn credits, existing hydro would be treated no Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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differently than coal facilities under a CES, which might seem perverse considering that an 
objective of the policy is to reduce emissions.17 However, it is precisely because of the region’s 
tremendous endowment of hydro resources that the Pacific Northwest enjoys electricity prices 
that are among the lowest in the country. A policy that would transfer wealth to that region from 
others that face much higher electricity prices is therefore dubious on equity grounds. Other 
types of clean technology that are less affordable and have come on-line more recently, like wind 
or solar, might be viewed as investments with positive climate externalities that were driven by 
environmental concerns. A wealth transfer to regions that have already incurred the costs of such 
investments may be easier to justify on equity grounds. 
The implications of the credit trading and associated electricity price effects of different 
CES policy designs for utility shareholders versus electricity consumers hinge on the form of 
electricity market regulation in each region. In cost-of-service regulated regions, the regional 
benefits (or costs) of qualifying an existing facility will accrue to (or be borne by) electricity 
consumers. In competitively priced regions, the effects could be shared between shareholders 
and consumers, but mostly, shareholders will gain at the expense of consumers. There are two 
components to this wealth transfer to shareholders. First, consumers will bear the burden of 
higher prices because of the increased requirement for credits per unit of consumption that would 
accompany the addition of a qualifying technology. Second, the additional credit revenues taken 
from consumers will, to the extent that the facilities with the lowest operating costs are qualified, 
accrue entirely to shareholders. This is because qualifying facilities with the lowest operating 
costs will not affect the marginal cost of electricity production. Therefore the only effect on 
electricity prices will be the increase from the higher level of the standard. Conversely, if 
facilities with higher operating costs are qualified, then the transfer from consumers to 
shareholders will be mitigated to the extent that the qualified facilities produce more electricity, 
thereby reducing marginal production costs and lowering prices. 
Figure 15 shows net credit revenue by region in 2035 under the Core CES case. Regions that 
are shaded red are net credit importers, and those that are shaded blue are net credit exporters. 
The intensity of the color reflects the level of net revenues or costs. Credit exports tend to be 
concentrated in the western states, with most of the eastern states importing credits. The 
exceptions are Indiana, where new investment in IGCC coal with CCS creates credits for export 
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in 2035, and northern California, which imports a small number of credits.  
 
Figure 15. Net federal credit revenues (B$) in Core scenario 
 
Figures 16 and 17 show the effects of excluding existing nuclear and hydro and crediting 
existing nuclear and hydro, respectively, on the amount of net revenue from clean energy credit 
trading. Each region is labeled with the total net credit revenue, and the color of each region 
represents the change in regional credit revenues when compared to the Core CES scenario. As 
described in Section 4.4, under the ExcludeNH scenario, each MWh generated by an existing 
nuclear or hydro facility will be granted an exclusion credit, and in equilibrium each of these 
credits is worth the price of a clean energy credit times the level of the CES requirement in each 
year. This additional crediting mechanism provides a new source of revenue for those regions 
with plentiful amounts of hydroelectric power (including New York, Northern California, 
Northern New England, and the Northwest Power Pool) and those regions with abundant nuclear 
(the Mid-Atlantic states, Northern California, Wisconsin-Illinois, and the Southeast) and thus 
enhances the net credit value in those regions, as show in Figure 16. Crediting existing nuclear 
and hydro (and the associated increase in the CES standard) creates even greater net revenues 
from credit sales in these regions of abundant nuclear and hydro power, as shown in Figure 17. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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For most of the other regions, the associated added burden of the increases in the target that 
accompanies either of these changes in policy design raises their costs of credit acquisition and 
requires that they import a greater number of credits from other regions, especially throughout 
Texas and the Plains states. In 2035, the Northwest region is earning roughly $5 billion from 
sales of credits under the CES design that credits existing nuclear and hydro, while both Florida 
and Ohio-Michigan are paying more than $2 billion for imported credits. All other regions 
experience smaller effects. 
 
Figure 16. Net federal credit revenues (B$) and changes from Core CES  
in ExcludeNH scenario 
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Figure 17. Net federal credit revenues (B$) and changes from Core CES  
in CreditNH scenario 
 
6. Conclusions 
In the absence of a direct cap on CO2 emissions, the next legislative attempt to reduce 
CO2 in the electricity sector is likely to be a clean energy standard to promote energy sources 
with low or no emissions. This analysis examines CES policies, similar to the proposal by the 
Obama administration, including different crediting schemes for existing nuclear and 
hydroelectric facilities. We find that the CES policies modeled would have a significant effect on 
electricity sector CO2 emissions. Between 2013 and 2035, the Core CES policy would achieve 
cumulative CO2 emissions reductions of roughly 30 percent, or 20 billion tons, relative to the 
baseline. This is 41 percent of the needed CO2 reductions to meet the U.S. pledge arising from 
the United Nations climate change conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun. 
A national CES would achieve emissions reductions from a change in the composition of 
electricity supply and would also produce large regional transfers of clean energy credits for 
dollars. These changes would drive regionally differentiated retail electricity price effects. The 
treatment of existing nuclear and hydro facilities—either excluding them from the program Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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altogether or qualifying them to receive credits—can also change the outcomes of the policy, 
particularly at the regional level. 
Under all of the CES variants modeled, a CES policy leads to extensive retirements of 
existing coal-fired (and some older gas-fired) capacity. Much of this retirement occurs in the 
coal-rich regions in the Midwest and Appalachian states and the Southeastern states. Nuclear 
capacity expansion could be the economically preferred approach to meeting the 2035 standard. 
If new nuclear deployment is constrained, coal gasification plants with carbon capture and 
sequestration could take up the slack. If both of these are constrained, wind would become the 
preferred approach to comply with the standard, accounting for roughly 20 percent of generation 
in 2035. 
Capacity and generation changes are driven by the price for clean energy credits. In each 
of the CES variants, the credit price remains below $1/MWh in the early years of the program 
but reaches roughly $70/MWh in 2025 and 2030. This suggests that a low alternative compliance 
payment, such as $21/MWh, as in some recent RPS proposals, would bind after 2020 and reduce 
the deployment of clean energy sources. This analysis does not include credit banking, which 
would cause the credit price to increase over time at the interest rate and would also make 
interim targets less important. 
The effect of a CES on national average electricity prices is small in 2020 but would be 
greater in 2035, amounting to roughly a 10–15 percent increase from baseline prices, depending 
on the specifics of the CES policy. The regional differences in price effects would be substantial. 
The Core CES scenario has an equalizing effect on regional prices, in which regions with 
existing high electricity prices would tend to see price reductions or only small price increases, 
while those experiencing the largest price increases would still enjoy relatively low prices. This 
effect is partly undone when existing nuclear and hydro facilities are excluded or given credits. 
Under these scenarios, regions with competitive electricity pricing see electricity price increases, 
relative to the Core CES case, as do cost-of-service pricing regions that do not have large 
endowments of existing nuclear and hydro capacity. Cost-of-service regions with existing 
nuclear or hydro capacity, primarily in the Northwest and Southeast, experience lower prices 
when these facilities are excluded or credited. These changes tend to be slightly larger when 
nuclear and hydro are credited than when these technologies are excluded from the policy 
altogether. 
The treatment of existing nuclear and hydro facilities also has important implications for 
regional costs or revenues from the transfer of clean energy credits. Under the Core CES policy Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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in 2035, a disproportionate fraction of clean energy generation occurs west of the Mississippi 
River, so most of the regions in the West receive net revenues from credit sales and most of the 
Eastern regions experience net costs from purchasing credits. When existing nuclear and hydro 
facilities are excluded from the program or qualified for credit generation, all regions experience 
increased costs because of the increase in the CES percentage, but regions with existing nuclear 
and hydro capacity also receive additional revenues from generating more clean energy credits. 
The Northwest, Northeast, Southeast (excluding Florida), and western Midwest tend to see 
increased revenues in these scenarios, relative to the Core CES. The Southwest, Plains, Florida, 
and eastern Midwest experience net costs in these scenarios. Excluding nuclear and hydro leads 
to smaller changes in transfers than when they are granted credits. 
This analysis provides some useful insights into the consequences of different forms of a 
CES policy for electricity consumers, electricity producers, and the environment. Many 
important questions remain about how other features of the CES policy design will affect its 
performance. Aspects that have yet to be explored include the implications of credit banking and 
borrowing, partial crediting of generation from existing nuclear and hydro, the role of alternative 
compliance payments, the relationship between a CES and policies to promote energy efficiency, 
and policy interactions between the CES and EPA regulations under the Clean Air Act to reduce 
emissions of CO2 from existing sources. Proposals to base a CES crediting on emissions rates 
instead of broad categories of technologies may create additional incentives to reduce emissions 
and could provide a bridge between EPA regulations of existing sources and the policy used to 
promote investment in cleaner generating technologies. Identification of the consequences of 
these design feature and alternative approaches requires additional modeling analysis. Stay 
tuned.  
   Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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Appendix: Haiku Electricity Market Model Description 
The Haiku electricity market model is used for some of the analysis in this document.18 
Haiku is a deterministic, highly parameterized simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector that 
calculates information similar to the Electricity Market Module of the National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS) used by EIA and the Integrated Planning Model developed by ICF Consulting 
and used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Haiku simulates equilibria in regional electricity markets and interregional electricity 
trade with an integrated algorithm for emissions control technology choices for sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury. Emissions of CO2 are also tracked but without any 
endogenous choice for emissions abatement technology retrofit. The model does capture the 
potential for investment in new integrated gasification combined cycle facilities that include 
carbon capture and storage capability. The composition of electricity supply is calculated for an 
intertemporally consistent capacity planning equilibrium that is coupled with a systems operation 
equilibrium over geographically linked electricity markets; the model solves for 21 regional 
markets covering the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Each region is classified by its method for 
determining the prices of electricity generation and reserve services as either market-based 
competition or cost-of-service regulation. Figure A1 shows the regions and pricing regimes. 
Electricity markets are assumed to maintain their current regulatory status throughout the 
modeling horizon; that is, regions that have already moved to competitive pricing continue that 
practice, and those that have not made that move remain regulated.19 The retail price of 
electricity does not vary by time of day in any region, though all customers in competitive 
regions face prices that vary from season to season. 
   
                                                 
18 Complete documentation of the model is available at Paul et al. (2009). http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-
Rpt-Haiku.v2.0.pdf. 
19 There is currently little momentum in any part of the country for electricity market regulatory restructuring. Some 
of the regions that have already implemented competitive markets are considering reregulating, and those that never 
instituted these markets are no longer considering doing so. Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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Figure A1. Haiku market regions and electricity market regulatory structure 
 
 
Each year is subdivided into three seasons (summer, winter, and spring-fall) and each 
season into four time blocks (superpeak, peak, shoulder, and base). For each time block, demand 
is modeled for three customer classes (residential, industrial, and commercial) in a partial 
adjustment framework that captures the dynamics of the long-run demand responses to short-run 
price changes. Supply is represented using model plants that are aggregated according to their 
technology and fuel source from the complete set of commercial electricity generation plants in 
the country. Operation of the electricity system (generator dispatch) in the model is based on the 
minimization of short-run variable costs of generation and a reserve margin is enforced based on 
those obtained by EIA in the AEO 2010. Investment in new generation capacity and the 
retirement of existing facilities are determined endogenously for an intertemporally consistent 
equilibrium, based on the capacity-related costs of providing service in the present and into the 
future (going-forward costs) and the discounted value of going-forward revenue streams. 
Discounting for new capacity investments is based on an assumed real cost of capital of 8 
percent. Generator availability, even for highly variable renewable resources, is captured in only Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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a deterministic sense, i.e. no capacity penalty is assigned to account for the probability that a 
generator may be unavailable when called upon by the system operator. 
The assumed costs and operational characteristics of new technologies are reported in 
Table A1. The capital costs change over time and in response to capacity additions (learning-by-
doing) based on the learning functions implemented in the NEMS model and described in the 
documentation of the AEO 2010 (EIA 2010b). Capital costs for technologies that are relatively 
immature fall faster than those for mature technologies. For example, capital costs for solar 
thermal generators are projected to fall by 46 percent by 2035, to $4,270 per kW, even in the 
absence of any new capacity additions. 
 
Table A1. Technology cost and performance assumptions 
 
 
Equilibrium in interregional power trading is identified as the level of trading necessary to 
equilibrate regional marginal generation costs net of transmission costs and power losses. These 
interregional transactions are constrained by the level of the available interregional transmission 











Coal without CCS 2,223 28.15 4.69 9,200 --
Coal with CCS 3,776 47.15 4.54 10,781 --
Conventional Natural Gas Combined Cycle 984 12.76 2.11 7,196 --
Advanced Natural Gas Combined Cycle 968 11.96 2.04 6,752 --
Conventional Natural Gas Combustion Turbine 685 12.38 3.65 10,788 --
Advanced Natural Gas Combustion Turbine 648 10.77 3.24 9,289 --
Advanced Nuclear 3,820 92.04 0.51 10,488 --
Onshore Wind 1,966* 30.98 0.00 -- 32-47**
Offshore Wind 3,937* 86.92 0.00 -- 34-50**
Biomass 3,849 65.89 6.86 9,451 --
Landfill Gas 2,599 116.80 0.01 13,648 --
Solar Thermal 7,948 58.05 0.00 -- 45
Geothermal 1,749 168.33 0.00 32,969 --
** Average capacity factors for wind plants vary by wind class with the minimum and maximum values shown here.
* These are the minimum overnight capital costs for wind plants. They are adjusted by multipliers that account for terrain and population density.Resources for the Future  Paul, Palmer, and Woerman 
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2003b).20 Factor prices, such as the cost of capital and labor, are held constant. Fuel prices are 
benchmarked to the forecasts of AEO 2010 (EIA 2010a) for both level and elasticity. Coal is 
differentiated along several dimensions, including fuel quality and content and location of 
supply, and both coal and natural gas prices are differentiated by point of delivery. The price of 
biomass fuel also varies by region depending on the mix of biomass types available and delivery 
costs. All of these fuels are modeled with price-responsive supply curves. Prices for nuclear fuel 
and oil are specified exogenously without any price responsiveness. 
Emissions caps in the Haiku model, such as the Title IV cap on national SO 2 emissions, 
EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule caps on emissions of SO2 and NOx, and the RGGI cap on CO2 
emissions, are imposed as constraints on the sum of emissions across all covered generation 
sources in the relevant regions. Emissions of these pollutants from individual sources depend on 
emission rates, which vary by type of fuel, technology, and total fuel use at the facility. The sum 
of these emissions across all sources must be no greater than the total number of allowances 
available, including those issued for the current year and any unused allowances from previous 








                                                 
20 Some of the Haiku market regions are not coterminous with North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
regions, and therefore NERC data cannot be used to parameterize transmission constraints. Haiku assumes no 
transmission constraints among regions OHMI, KVWV, and IN. NEN and NES are also assumed to trade power 
without constraints. The transmission constraints among the regions ENTN, VACAR, and AMGF, as well as those 
among NJD, MD, and PA, are derived from version 2.1.9 of the Integrated Planning Model (U.S. EPA 2005). 
Additionally, starting in 2014, we include the incremental transfer capability associated with two new 500-KV 
transmission lines into and, in one case, through Maryland, which are modeled after a line proposed by Allegheny 
Electric Power and one proposed by PEPCO Holdings (CIER 2007). We also include the transmission capability 
between Long Island and PJM made possible by the Neptune line, which began operation in 2007. 